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Nontechnical Summary
This lecture, delivered at the International Economic Association
World Congress in Buenos Aires, August 1999, describes some em-
pirical regularities in cross-country patterns of aggregate economic
growth, and discusses how theoretical reasoning has guided their anal-
ysis.
It uses three themes. The ﬁrst builds on an observation that ap-
pears, at ﬁrst, obvious and perhaps trivial. This observation is that
cross-country comparisons matter, both empirically and theoretically.
By this, I do not mean the near-afterthought where a researcher looks
at what happens across countries, only as a way to provide variation in
a cross-country regression equation describing a representative econ-
omy. Instead, I refer to empirical and theoretical analysis that looks
at why diﬀerences across, relations among, and interactions between
countries matter for economic growth.
Kaldor’s stylized facts is the source from which most economists
ﬁrst learn the empirics of growth. That list does in its last item men-
tion the variation in economic performance across countries. But until
recently, this point had not been picked up on as much as Kaldor’s
other enumerations—on constancies of ratios and income shares, and
on the relations between aggregate variables, all within a single grow-
ing economy. Credit for this reorienting towards cross-country anal-
yses must go to the diﬀerent projects to construct, for many diﬀerent
countries, comparable cross-country data on macro aggregates. This
then is the second theme.
Robert Summers and Alan Heston, two University of Pennsylva-
nia economists, have provided the best-known data compilation here.
As with the developers of theorems on estimators in econometrics,
those authors cannot be held responsible for how their data are used
or misused. But that their 1988 and 1991 papers have to date seen
900 citations in scholarly economics publications is surely testament
to how they have shifted the debate since Kaldor. (According to the
Social Science Citation Index, by May 1999 these two papers had
been cited 840 times. This is, moreover, almost surely an undercount
as the Summers-Heston data have reached a notoriety where they are
sometimes referred to and used without explicit citation.)
There is a ﬁnal, third theme in this lecture—actually more subtext
and spin than a theme proper. That is technology. By this, I mean
not just a factor that shifts production functions. Instead, I refer
more to knowledge in the form of ideas, blueprints, and design.
Sure, knowledge perturbs production technologies. Accumulat-
ing knowledge shifts out the production possibilities frontier. It has
done so since at least the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th cen-
tury. But of at least equal concern, I believe, when we discuss growth
relations across countries is the ‘nonrivalry’ of knowledge (or what
Thomas Jeﬀerson called its ‘inﬁnite expansibility’), and the healthy
disrespect that knowledge shows for physical geography, the political
boundaries of nation states, and other artiﬁcial barriers constructed
by economic agents. Some of these provide key insight into so-called
“endogenous growth”. But other implications for economic perfor-
mance follow as well.
Many have remarked how knowledge cannot be exchanged as a
standard Arrow-Debreu commodity. But we have other ways of mod-
elling its production and dissemination. By happy coincidence, the
same economics that helps us analyze these is useful also for thinking
about other, in my view, exclusively modern (and therefore post-
Kaldor) features of economic performance. Those features acquire
ever greater prominence when progressively more of aggregate eco-
nomic value is generated in commodities like computer software, com-
munications technology, biotechnology and genetic databases, and
Internet-mediated activity. What is signiﬁcant now and diﬀerent from
earlier times is that the economic concerns surrounding technology do
not center exclusively on technical developments in the shipbuilding
dock or airplane hanger, on the shopﬂoor or manufacturing assembly
line, or in the R&D cleanroom or engineering laboratory. Instead,
the interest in information, knowledge, and technology centers on
their direct impact on and immediacy to consumers. It is irrele-
vant whether one regards to be scientiﬁc knowledge software such as
Windows 95 or cryptography algorithms, or for that matter, a video
game. These commodities happen to have all the essential properties
of scientiﬁc knowledge—inﬁnite expansibility, disrespect for geogra-
phy, and so on. In this view, knowledge is no longer only something
produced in R&D labs through Schumpeterian competition. Instead,
commodities that behave like knowledge have now been taken out of
the domain of scientists and engineers, and brought upfront to the
ﬁnal consumer. How does this inﬂuence patterns of economic growth
from here on out?
These last changes I have just described do not yet have enough of
a data presence that I can discuss their cross-country growth empir-
ics. However, acknowledging them helps explain why my subsequent
discussion is structured the way it is.
New growth theory is a branch of analysis that has had some crit-
ics suggesting its development arises from an internal dynamic, that
in improvement in economists’ mathematical tools. This lecture ar-
gues that the professional success of new growth theory has not arisen
solely from that. While it is true ever more intricate models have now
become tractable to analysis, that itself is an endogenous outcome
that is explained by or jointly emergent with yet other developments.
Successful development of growth theory has only proceeded in step
and simultaneous with the concerns of empirical research and topical
policy.
By the last, I mean simply acknowledging the increasingly impor-
tant roles of information, knowledge, and high technology in everyday
economic life, and government responses to that growing recogni-
tion. Those changes are highlighted by, for instance, much-debated
and economically signiﬁcant legal decisions being made on Internet
and operating system technology—words that had no meaning in the
1950s and 1960s, but are now common currency among consumers.
Before the early 1990s, the demands of empirical research and
topical policy—in their current forms—were never as visible nor as
pressing. And it is this, in my estimation, that accounts for the reso-
nance and appeal of recent research in both theoretical and empirical
analyses of economic growth. At the same time, however, this shift
also comes with a warning: “traditional” growth models that empha-
size endogenous technology on the production side of the economy
might not provide the sharpest insights for how technology matters
in the economy now.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this lecture I describe some empirical regularities in cross-country
patterns of aggregate economic growth, and discuss how theoretical
reasoning has guided their analysis.
Those longtime participants in this audience already know the
lead role in these topics that the IEA has taken for almost its entire
history. The well-known Kaldor stylized facts on growth—so well-
known they are now no longer given a proper citation—were ﬁrst set
down explicitly in the Proceedings volume of an IEA Conference forty
years ago (Kaldor, 1961). This focus on and interest in economic
growth has been maintained through all the IEA meetings since—
quickly established by looking through the series of World Congress
published volumes.
How then can I say anything that might surprise, or in any way
approach something post-Kaldor?
I will use three themes in addressing the topic I mentioned at the
beginning of this lecture. The ﬁrst builds on an observation in the
literature that appears, at ﬁrst, obvious and perhaps trivial. This ob-
servation is that cross-country comparisons matter, both empirically
and theoretically. By this, I do not mean the near-afterthought where
a researcher looks at what happens across countries, only as a way to
provide variation in a cross-country regression equation describing a
representative economy. Instead, I refer to empirical and theoretical
analysis that looks at why diﬀerences across, relations among, and
interactions between countries matter for economic growth.
Kaldor’s list of stylized facts does in its last item mention the vari-
ation in economic performance across countries. But until recently,
this point had not been picked up on as much as Kaldor’s other
enumerations—on constancies of ratios and income shares, and on
the relations between aggregate variables, all within a single growing
economy. Credit for this reorienting towards cross-country analyses
must go to the diﬀerent projects to construct, for many diﬀerent coun-
tries, comparable cross-country data on macro aggregates. This then
is my second theme.
Summers and Heston (1988, 1991) provide the key and best-known
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data compilation here. As with the developers of theorems on esti-
mators in econometrics, those authors cannot be held responsible for
how their data are used or misused. But that their 1988 and 1991
papers have to date seen 900 citations in scholarly economics publi-
cations is surely testament to how they have shifted the debate since
Kaldor.1
There is a ﬁnal, third theme in this lecture—actually more subtext
and spin than a theme proper. That is technology. By this, I mean
not just a factor that shifts production functions. Instead, I refer
more to knowledge in the form of ideas, blueprints, and design.
Sure, knowledge perturbs production technologies. Accumulat-
ing knowledge shifts out the production possibilities frontier. It has
done so since at least the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th cen-
tury. But of at least equal concern, I believe, when we discuss growth
relations across countries is the ‘nonrivalry’ of knowledge (or what
Thomas Jeﬀerson called its ‘inﬁnite expansibility’), and the healthy
disrespect that knowledge shows for physical geography, the political
boundaries of nation states, and other artiﬁcial barriers constructed
by economic agents.2 Some of these—in the work of Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1990), and
others—provide key insight into so-called “endogenous growth”. But
1 According to the Social Science Citation Index, by May 1999
these two papers had been cited 840 times. This is, moreover, almost
surely an undercount as the Summers-Heston data have reached a
notoriety where they are sometimes referred to and used without
explicit citation.
2 Arrow (1962) provides an early formalization and technical dis-
cussion of these properties. That many empirical studies have found
knowledge spillovers geographically localized presents a puzzle to re-
solve, not a fundamental shift of principle. Those ﬁndings might sug-
gest, say, that in certain economic activities, tacit knowledge trans-
mitted only through speciﬁc kinds of interactions matter more than
do generally-broadcasted codiﬁable knowledge. Nonetheless, how-
ever, the latter can remain the more important and signiﬁcant for
understanding cross-country patterns of growth.
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other implications for economic performance follow as well.
Many have remarked how knowledge cannot be exchanged as a
standard Arrow-Debreu commodity. But we have other ways of mod-
elling its production and dissemination. By happy coincidence, the
same economics that helps us analyze these is useful also for thinking
about other, in my view, exclusively modern (and therefore post-
Kaldor) features of economic performance. Those features acquire
ever greater prominence when progressively more of aggregate eco-
nomic value is generated in commodities like computer software, com-
munications technology, biotechnology and genetic databases, and
Internet-mediated activity. What is signiﬁcant now and diﬀerent from
earlier times is that the economic concerns surrounding technology do
not center exclusively on technical developments in the shipbuilding
dock or airplane hanger, on the shopﬂoor or manufacturing assembly
line, or in the R&D cleanroom or engineering laboratory. Instead,
the interest in information, knowledge, and technology centers on
their direct impact on and immediacy to consumers. It is irrele-
vant whether one regards to be scientiﬁc knowledge software such as
Windows 95 or cryptography algorithms, or for that matter, a video
game. These commodities happen to have all the essential properties
of scientiﬁc knowledge—inﬁnite expansibility, disrespect for geogra-
phy, and so on. In this view, knowledge is no longer only something
produced in R&D labs through Schumpeterian competition. Instead,
commodities that behave like knowledge have now been taken out of
the domain of scientists and engineers, and brought upfront to the
ﬁnal consumer. How does this inﬂuence patterns of economic growth
from here on out?
These last changes I have just described do not yet have enough of
a data presence that I can discuss their cross-country growth empir-
ics. However, acknowledging them helps explain why my subsequent
discussion is structured the way it is.
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2 GROWTHANDDEVELOPMENTACROSS COUN-
TRIES
In a key paper re-igniting professional interest in economic growth,
Robert Lucas (1988, p. 3) described the question to address as follows:
“By the problem of economic development I mean simply
the problem of accounting for the observed pattern, across
countries and across time, in levels and rates of growth of
per capita income. This may seem too narrow a deﬁnition,
and perhaps it is, but thinking about income patterns
will necessarily involve us in thinking about many other
aspects of societies too, so I would suggest that we withold
judgment on the scope of this deﬁnition until we have a
clearer idea of where it leads us.”
Lucas quickly concedes that for some, his deﬁnition has too much a
hard-nosed, mainstream economics focus on only per capita income.3
However, Debraj Ray’s excellent textbook on development economics,
among others, notes that while a broader, multi-faceted view is, in
principle, the appropriate perspective, per capita income is a pretty
good proxy for many of the important dimensions to development
(Ray, 1998, p. 29).
This 1988 statement of Lucas’s usefully contrasts with a compa-
rable one from 1969: Stiglitz and Uzawa, eds (1969, p. 3) introduced
the then-modern theory of economic growth as follows:
“The primary objective of the modern theory of economic
growth is to explain, on the one hand, the movements in
the output, employment, and capital stock of a growing
economy and the inter-relations among these variables,
and on the other hand, to explain the movements in the
distribution of income among the factors of production.”
3 Composite indexes for, say, “physical quality of life” or “human
development” might take into account indicators such as infant mor-
tality, life expectancy, educational attainment, per capita incomes
downweighting higher values, literacy rates, and so on.
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times world per capita income
Per capita income
in national
economies
1960–64 1985–89
10th %-ile 0.22 × 0.15 ×
(26.0% world popn.) (3.3% world popn.)
90th %-ile 2.70 × 3.08 ×
(12.5% world popn.) (9.3% world popn.)
(25th-15th) %-iles 0.13 × 0.06 ×
(95th-85th) %-iles 0.98 × 0.59 ×
Table 1: Evolution of country per capita incomes
The diﬀerence between the two positions can be simply stated.
Stiglitz and Uzawa were concerned with explaining conditions within
a single economy through time. Lucas’s evocative statement, on the
other hand, removed the limits conﬁning that analysis to within na-
tional boundaries and asked, Can we understand what is happening
over time to the entire cross section of countries?
Earlier growth theorists and empiricists might simply have con-
ﬁned themselves to within-country studies because they thought dif-
ferent countries were, well, diﬀerent. Researchers have long known
about the biases and omissions in developing-country national in-
come accounts. Comparison of those data with the data of developed
countries can be unreliable even when within-country analysis over
time for a given economy is perfectly sensible. That Switzerland’s per
capita income is 400 times Tanzania’s at oﬃcial exchange rates prob-
ably does not mean the same thing as Bill Gates’s being 400 times
wealthier than the 95th-percentile household in the US. But this ex-
cuse for excess caution in cross-country comparison has lost some
of its punch with World Bank, UN, and Summers-Heston eﬀorts at
purchasing power parity corrections in aggregate income data across
countries. Such adjustments cannot remove all problems in cross-
country comparisons, but the obvious analytical diﬃculties are now
minimized.
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Between 1960 and 1990, average per capita income in the world
grew by 2.25% per annum. Individual country performance ﬂuctu-
ated around this worldwide average growth path. Table 1 shows the
evolution of country per capita incomes over this period. The ﬁgures
take countries as the basic unit of observation and are relative to
world average per capita income. Thus, the ﬁrst entry in the Table
shows that over the ﬁve-year period 1960–1964 the 10th percentile
country had per capita income only 22% of the world average. The
ratio of the 90th percentile per capita income to the 10th percentile
averaged over 1960–1964 was 12. By the beginning of the 1990s, this
ratio had increased to 21, a 67% increase over 25 years. That rise
in disparities came from both a relative decline at the bottom of the
cross-country income distribution and a relative increase at the top
end.
Table 1 also shows the fraction of the world’s population contained
in the top and bottom deciles of countries. We see a remarkable
decline in population share of the bottom decile from 26% to 3%.
This, however, is due to a single economy, China, exiting the group
of very poorest countries. Taking out China, the modiﬁed Table 1
(not presented here) says two things. First, the richest countries are
usually larger, and the poorer countries smaller. Second, over time,
the share of the world’s population living in the very richest countries
has declined, while that in the very poorest has increased.
What I have just described suggests to me that if one is interested
in the worldwide distribution of incomes across people—not just that
across countries—additional insights are available by looking directly
at the distribution of incomes across people within these countries,
and then merging that information with the data underlying Table 1.
It will take us too much out of the way to go into that discussion here,
but some quick comments are in order. China’s transition out of the
bottom decile of countries has been associated with an increase in its
personal income inequality. Thus, it might seem misleading to suggest
that only 3.3% of the world’s population remained in the bottom
decile by the end of the 1980s. Of course, Table 1 does not actually say
that, but, regardless, we also know that the increase in within-country
inequality in China did not stop hundreds of millions of Chinese from
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becoming markedly better oﬀ over this 25-year period. In a simple
accounting sense, China’s growth in per capita income did remove a
signiﬁcant fraction of the world’s population from poverty. On this,
therefore, Table 1 does not mislead.
Calculations show that the ﬂavor of this conclusion carries more
generally.4 Inequality within countries has certainly changed through
time. But the magnitude of those variations is dwarfed by that of
changes in per capita incomes due to aggregate economic growth.
Thus, to understand the distribution dynamics of worldwide individ-
ual incomes, not just of cross-country economic performance, Table 1
does a pretty good job representing the salient facts.
The ﬁnal two rows of the Table show a progressive narrowing
of income distance between the ten percentile points centred on the
10th and 90th percentiles respectively. This indicates a clustering of
observations around those two distinct points on the cross-country
income distribution.
An alternative depiction of the message of Table 1 is shown in the
emerging twin peaks of Fig. 1. The Figure illustrates the evolution of
the cross-country per capita income distribution, using an estimated
model of distribution dynamics. Fig. 2 shows the actual cross-country
distributions in 1960 and 1988, with the incipient rise of the two
modes. To understand the mechanics of the emerging twin peaks in
Fig. 1, turn to Fig. 3: This shows likelihoods of transiting over time
from one part of the income distribution to another. Contour plots of
the graph on the left of Fig. 3 show probability mass clustering around
distinct parts of the diagonal, and thus greater likelihoods, relatively,
of remaining in those parts of the income space upon entry there.
Trace through the dynamics of the system by repeatedly applying
the estimated stochastic kernel in Fig. 3 to Fig. 2. (Quah, 1997, gives
details on this procedure).
4 For further details, the reader might wish to consult Heston and
Summers (1999), Milanovic (1999), and Quah (1999a).
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3 GROWTH THEORY AND EMPIRICS
What do growth models say about Figs. 1–3?
The answer I want to give is, an unsatisfactory combination of “a
great deal” and “not a lot” simultaneously. To see why, it suﬃces to
consider the simplest version of the Solow (1956) growth model. The
conclusions I will draw relevant for Figs. 1–3 will follow from many
other models as well.
The model is standard, and the very brief exposition that follows
is mostly to establish notation. Let Y be total output, N be the work-
force, and K be the total capital stock. Denote per worker quantities
in lower case:
y
def= Y/N k def= K/N. (1)
Output depends on K, N , and technology A through a standard
smooth neoclassical production function. Assume technology A en-
ters the production function multiplicatively in N so that output per
worker can then be written as
y = Af(k/A), f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, lim
k→∞
f(k)k−1 = 0. (2)
Technology and the workforce evolve exogenously at constant growth
rates
A˙/A = ξ ≥ 0, A(0) > 0 (3)
N˙/N = ν ≥ 0. N(0) > 0 (4)
Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ and accumulates through
savings equal to fraction τ of total income Y :
K˙ = τY − δK, τ in (0, 1) and δ > 0. (5)
Combining (1) through (5) gives the dynamic equation for capital per
worker:
k˙/k − A˙/A = τ f(k/A)
k/A
− (δ + ν + ξ) (6)
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The right side of this equation has the graph given in Fig. 4. Under
the standard curvature assumptions on f given in (2), equation (6)
has a unique steady-state value [k/A]∗.
Taking together equations (2), (3), and (6) then gives observable
dynamics for labor productivity:
log y(t) = Γ0 + ξ · t+ [log y(0)− Γ0]eλt, (7)
where
Γ0 = log f ([k/A]∗) + logA(0)
= g
(
[δ + ν + ξ]−1τ
)
+ logA(0), with g′ > 0,
and λ = λ(f, (δ + ν + ξ), τ) < 0.
These dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 5. For any single economy,
say with output per worker y1, economic history is the transition
from its initial level to a speciﬁc steady-state path. However, the
Figure also shows that the cross section of economies, having diﬀerent
underlying steady-state paths varying with Γ0, displays a wide range
of possible behaviors. Economies 2 and 3 diverge away from each
other, criss-crossing along the way although they began close together
at a middle-income level. Economies like 1 begin and remain rich;
those like 4 begin and remain poor. If the number of countries exceeds
that of underlying steady-state paths, then a clustering in the cross
section distribution, as in the emerging twin peaks in Fig. 1 could
well arise.5
The cross section therefore shows great diversity. Despite that,
the average economy (or, for that matter, each economy taken in iso-
lation) shows a straightforward relentless monotone convergence to
its unique underlying steady-state growth path. The behavior of the
cross-section distribution and that of the individual, while each con-
sistent with the other, send markedly diﬀerent messages about what
5 More subtle analysis on this same point, within a representa-
tive economy framework, appear in Azariadis and Drazen (1990), De
Castro (1999), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Solow (1997).
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is quantitatively important. Indeed, a researcher might well conclude
he has a good understanding of economic growth after successfully
calibrating the dynamic performance of a single economy, but, at the
same time, leaving completely at odds the situation for the entire
cross section.
In this accounting, understanding the behavior of a representa-
tive economy entails understanding the economics in ξ and λ. Un-
derstanding the disparities in the cross section means clarifying the
sources of diﬀerences in Γ0. Of course, the economics in equations
(2) through (5) does not separate cleanly these two sets of factors.
Any single economic analysis will usually have implications for both.
Knowledge on and guesses about the magnitudes of diﬀerent elastic-
ities will be needed to isolate what matters more for which.
Here I will pursue technology A, as the key force underlying Γ0.
That technology matters, even within a single economy and for the
ﬁrst ﬁfty years of the twentieth century (much less now), is a point
already made as early as Solow (1957): the increase in output per
worker from $0.62 per worker-hour in 1900 to $1.28 in 1949 has only
12.6% explained by k; the rest, an overwhelming 87.4%, is due to A.
(I mention these earliest growth-accounting estimates here, rather
than later ones that, say, correct for changes in quality of the factors
of production. It might well be that upon proper quality-adjustment,
these Solow (1957) results can be amended until nothing remains
in A. However, my hunch is that that economic reasoning used for
understandingA is also the best reasoning available for understanding
the economics of the new ideas that improve quality in factors of
production. Put another way, what else is it but technology that
improves factors of production?)
We can assess A’s cross-section importance by asking what we
should observe if it were absent or, equivalently for our purposes,
identical across countries. A US/India comparison is instructive here.
In the Summers-Heston data, for the forty years from 1950 through
1990, the ratio of US to Indian output per worker averaged 14.6. Over
the same period, US output per worker grew at 1.5% per year while
Indian output per worker grew at 2.3% per year. Output per worker
varies from year to year, and while long-run growth rates in the two
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countries have diﬀered—so that a trend change has occurred—the
variation is certainly not monotone.
If we assume that in equation (2), f is derived from a Cobb-
Douglas production function,
y = A× (k/A)α,
and capital’s income share α is taken to be 0.4—roughly what it is
calculated to be in many countries—then the ratio of physical cap-
ital’s rate of return in India to that in the US should be 56! That
worldwide capital ﬂows do not wipe out this huge diﬀerential means
something other than just diﬀerences in k must be responsible for the
variation in income levels across the rich and poor countries.
Noting that India while poorer is also growing faster, we can per-
form one further calculation. Maintaining the just-used assumptions,
we obtain from equations (2) and (6) an explicit expression for how
growth rates, in the transition to steady state, vary as a function of
observable variables:
y˙/y = [ξ − (δ + ν + ξ)α] +
(
αA
1
α
−1
)
× τy1− 1α
If the term in square brackets on the right of this equation is approx-
imately equal across countries, then to explain how growth rates and
income levels diﬀer across US and India, the savings rate in the US
must be more than 35 times that in India!
These calculations, where I have simply replicated arguments in
Lucas (1990) and Romer (1994), show, in my estimation, the im-
portance of technology A in explaining the large cross-sectional vari-
ation in economic performance across countries. This can be put
alternatively as follows. Suppose one uses as organizing framework
the growth model (1)–(5). How much of the plight of poor countries
is due to shortage of material resources like physical capital? The
answer suggested by the calculations just presented is, Very little.
There are a range of possibilities how one proceeds from here.
A researcher might calculate regressions with measured per capita
income growth on the left side and a variety of ad hoc conditioning
variables on the right. This is done with the view that that wide
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range of conditioning variables can then potentially explain growth
in A. Ideally, these regressions should describe the steady-state paths
in Fig. 5 while convergence regressions describe transitions to those
steady states. A large literature, following a line of reasoning given in
Barro (1997), has taken exactly this route. Some of these regressions
can be informative, others not easily interpretable, most fragile, and
a considerable fraction what some have called “a blaze of mediocre
sociology”—Durlauf and Quah (1999) tabulate over one hundred such
equations estimated in the literature.6
The empirical analysis can also adopt more intricate methods. An
argument is sometimes made that because the data studied in cross-
country growth comparisons vary in both cross-section and time-series
dimensions, a panel-data analysis is appropriate and informative.
Fig. 5 suggests the opposite. To appreciate this, recall that panel-
data analysis typically conditions out (or “corrects for”) individual
heterogeneities—the so-called ﬁxed eﬀects or random eﬀects. Being
able to do this, in many microeconometric panel-data studies, is a
virtue. In cross-country growth comparisons, however, it is a defect.
As represented in Fig. 5, the variation we are concerned with is pre-
cisely that in the underlying country-speciﬁc heterogeneities. This
variation occupies center stage in interest—it is exactly what under-
lies why some countries are rich, and others poor. Conditioning it out
as statistical nuisance parameters—ﬁxed or random eﬀects, or more
generally as unobservable individual heterogeneities—is, in my view,
exactly the opposite of what one should do.7
6 The informativeness of such regressions been discussed many
times elsewere; see, e.g., Durlauf (1996), Quah (1996), and Sala-i-
Martin (1996).
7 In some cases (e.g., ﬁxed-eﬀects averaging), a researcher can re-
cover what might appear to be estimates of the underlying individual
heterogeneities. It is, however, unclear whether those are useful for
the current cross-country growth application. To see this, recall that
most sophisticated panel-data techniques are speciﬁcally designed to
estimate a low-dimensioned parameter vector, without requiring or
achieving consistent estimation of the individual heterogeneities. This
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A reasoned view on these growth regressions—cross-section or
panel—is that the researchers concerned have simply given up on the
idea that A represents technology. Instead, A could be anything or
everything in a list that includes income inequality, political stability,
democracy, property rights regimes, climate, geography, openness of
the economy, ﬁnancial depth, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and
many others. No theory exists that says these variables should not
aﬀect economic performance somehow. Casual observation suggests
they likely do. However, once we step outside a technology interpre-
tation for A, all these diﬀerent alternatives amount to believing that
societies act in such a way that the resulting outcome falls strictly
inside the production possibilities frontier.
On the other hand, even hewing (over-conservatively perhaps but
with a scientiﬁc discipline) to the simple growth theory laid out in
(1) –(5), it remains that one has not yet completely exhausted un-
derstanding of the possibilities when A is technology. Why ﬂit to
another lode of ore when so much is still to be clariﬁed? Moreover, a
technology-based approach is ﬁrmly both old growth theory and new
growth theory: The extremes agree on the importance of technology;
it’s those in the middle that diverge.
To be sure, some might argue that the partition between k and A
in my discussion is artiﬁcial, and that the two, in reality, develop in
tandem. This is doubtless true, and interesting research (e.g., Howitt
and Aghion, 1996) has formalized this argument further.
In this lecture I want to abstract from such conceptual multi-
collinearity in k and A. I ask instead, What determines the distri-
bution of A across countries? This is a question in the economics
of technology and knowledge dissemination. Analyzing it reveals a
discipline for what would otherwise simply be behavior leading to
outcomes strictly within the production possibilities frontier.
is why such methods are so remarkable—doing the last-mentioned is
typically impossible as the dimensionality of individual eﬀects is com-
parable to sample size. But then it is almost accidental (and perhaps
unfortunate) that things looking like estimates of individual eﬀects
can be obtained, even when statistically meaningless.
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4 TECHNOLOGY ACROSS COUNTRIES
To motivate the theoretical and empirical modelling choices here, a
useful ﬁrst observation is that the important interactions leading to
A’s dissemination have to lie outside conventional market exchange.
Because A is inﬁnitely expansible or nonrival, its free trade would lead
to the zero-price, market-failure outcome identiﬁed in Arrow (1962).
Even if regimes for intellectual property rights (IPRs)—patents, copy-
rights, trade secrets—putatively enforce monopolistic outcomes in the
development and provision of A, such systems are contrivances that
societies have come to construct and that natural competitive forces
seek to circumvent.8 IPRs are neither primitive nor intrinsic to the
problem of technology and idea dissemination (David, 1993).
We can organize relevant analysis into two broad categories, as
described by the duality in Fig. 6. The Figure’s left panel represents
one category, by far the larger in the literature. This analysis takes as
given the set of possible follower and leader countries: it then models
the rate—fast or slow—of possible catchup in technology levels, and
considers the possibility of overtaking. Empirical examples of such
analyses include Bernard and Jones (1996), Coe and Helpman (1995),
and Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1998). The right panel of
Fig. 6 shows the other category, much smaller, that takes the set
of economy identities not as given but as objects to be determined.
It asks, Which are the economies that turn out to be followers and
leaders in which (joint) subgroups; what forces determine who gets
included in what clusters? This analysis is relatively new, and in-
cludes Keely (1999)and Quah (1997, 1999b) in cross-country growth,
although the theoretical ideas and tools useful here are also only see-
ing recent development (e.g., Bloch, 1996; Ray and Vohra, 1997, 1999;
Yi, 1997).
The analysis in Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1998) well
represents the concepts and results in the ﬁrst strand of literature.
8 Software and Internet development provide powerful real-world
examples of how the forces Arrow (1962) identiﬁed will re-route
around artiﬁcial barriers like intellectual property rights.
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Consider two economies 0 and j, where 0 indexes the initial leader
and j a representative follower. Write A dissemination as:
A˙j/Aj = ξj − βj ×
(
Aj − ψjA0
A0
)
,
Aj(0), βj , ξj ≥ 0; ψj ∈ [0, 1].
(8)
This adds a layer of complication over the leader country’s assumed
behavior, taken from equation (3):
A˙0/A0 = ξ0 = ξ ≥ 0, A0(0) > 0.
In (8), the constants ξj, βj , and ψj are interpreted, respectively, as
j’s own natural growth rate, j’s rate of technology catchup, and the
fraction of A0 potentially transferable to j.
To clarify what a speciﬁcation like (8) delivers, deﬁne relative
technology aj
def= Aj/A0. Then (8) implies a steady state value a∗j
and transition dynamics:
a∗j = (ξj − ξ0)β−1j + ψj
a˙j/aj = −βj × (aj − a∗j )
These relations deliver a simple quantiﬁcation of convergence, diver-
gence, or persistent stagnation, depending on where the value a∗j lies
relative to 1, and on the value of βj . Except when ξj is the same as
ξ0, steady-state relative technology depends on more than just ψj .
It is easy in concept, moreover, to justify and estimate the depen-
dence of ξj, βj , and ψj on variables such as openness, R&D expendi-
ture, or human capital. As just one empirical example, the estimates
in Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1998), combining a range of
such indicators, suggest that for the UK relative to the US, a∗j is, for
diﬀerent industries, between 53% and 92%.
Such empirical analyses are useful for pointing the way forwards
and establishing what matters empirically. However, the authors
themselves have no illusion about the reduced-form nature of the
work thus far. It remains unclear, also, whether such analyses can
lead usefully to conclusions about the dynamics of the entire cross
section, or will be restricted to pairwise comparisons.
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Empirical analysis in the second category is in even earlier stages.
Calculations in Quah (1997) suggested that patterns of trade—who
trades with whom—rather than just openness, say, matters impor-
tantly for the patterns of clusterings that emerge in the cross section
of countries. The theoretical counterparts to that empirical work re-
main to be studied: A reasonable conjecture is that theories of coali-
tion formation—for idea- and technology-sharing clusters, implicit or
explicit—will ﬁgure prominently. The key economic consideration is,
How does it serve the self-interest of the putative leader—the source of
the frontier technology—to have speciﬁc hangers-on taking advantage
of and learning that technology? What do potential followers bring
to the interaction between them that beneﬁts the economy having
the current technological lead?
5 CONCLUSIONS
In their lecture to the Tenth IEA World Congress in Moscow in 1992,
Aghion and Howitt (1995) reviewed the issues and content in new
growth theory. They observed economics was “experiencing the sec-
ond post-war wave of neoclassical growth theory”.
At the same time, however, they noted that much of the sub-
stance and many of the ideas in the theory of economic growth had,
for decades if not longer, already seen serious work by the most pen-
etrating, analytical minds in the profession. For Aghion and Howitt,
no “grand new insights into the workings of market economies” could
explain the remarkable rapid development of endogenous growth the-
ory. They were, therefore, led to ask (Aghion and Howitt, 1995, p.
102):
“What, then, accounts for the phenomenal success of a
theory with no fundamentally new ideas on a subject that
has been studied for centuries?”
We know their question had to be in part rhetorical if not downright
disingenuous and mischievous (especially the “no fundamentally new
ideas” phrasing) as Aghion and Howitt have been among the new
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theory’s most proliﬁc developers.
Their answer, similar to that given in Romer (1994), is the tech-
nical progress in tools and concepts that economists can now apply
in equilibrium analysis. In particular, dynamic general equilibrium
analysis with increasing returns—of which endogenous technology is
a special case—is now routine.
Among other things, my goal in this paper has been to suggest
how Aghion and Howitt (1995) and Romer (1994) have been overly
modest. A more complete explanation, in my view, includes at least
the following:
1. Cross-country focus on development and growth, more broadly
construed;
2. Improvement in data availability;
3. The topicality of high technology, now taken out of R&D labs
and the narrow domain of scientists and engineers.
These points are not entirely distinct. The ﬁrst two of these obviously
interact with each other. And, they feed directly into this paper’s
main topic, What is the cross-country growth record, and how has
economic theory helped design its empirical analysis? This lecture has
described how looking across countries is important and how doing so
signals which models—theoretical and empirical—should be the ones
to provide further quantitatively important insights.
Items 1.–3., in my view, temper Aghion and Howitt’s suggestion
that the accomplishments of recent research in endogenous growth
have been “more a matter of form than substance”, that “endoge-
nous growth theory has succeeded mainly because of its technical
progress” (i.e., in the tools that equilibrium theory now aﬀords), and
that “technique has come to dominate new ideas as the determinant
of professional success”.
In this lecture, I have argued the opposite. The professional suc-
cess of the theory has not arisen solely from technological change in
practitioners. While it is true ever more intricate models have now
become tractable to analysis, that itself is an endogenous outcome
that is explained by or jointly emergent with yet other developments.
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Successful development of growth theory has only proceeded in step
and simultaneous with the concerns of empirical research and topical
policy.
By the last, I mean simply acknowledging the increasingly impor-
tant roles of information, knowledge, and high technology in everyday
economic life, and government responses to that growing recognition.9
What is signiﬁcant now and diﬀerent from earlier times is that the
economic concerns surrounding technology do not center on techni-
cal developments in the shipbuilding dock or airplane hanger, on the
shopﬂoor or manufacturing assembly line, or in the R&D cleanroom
or engineering laboratory. Instead, the interest in information, knowl-
edge, and technology centers on their direct impact on and immedi-
acy to consumers.10 Those changes are highlighted by much-debated
and economically signiﬁcant legal decisions being made on Internet
and operating system technology—words that had no meaning in the
1950s and 1960s, but are now common currency among consumers.
Before the early 1990s, the demands of empirical research and
topical policy—in their current forms—were never as visible nor as
pressing. And it is this, in my estimation, that accounts for the reso-
nance and appeal of recent research in both theoretical and empirical
analyses of economic growth. At the same time, however, this shift
also comes with a warning: “traditional” growth models that empha-
size endogenous technology on the production side of the economy
might not provide the sharpest insights for how technology matters
in the economy now.
9 Obvious expressions of this include Industry Canada (1994),
UK Department of Trade and Industry (1998), and World Bank
(1998). Elsewhere, government policies in Australia, Finland, India,
and Singapore—among others—are notable examples where knowl-
edge and technology have come explicitly to the fore.
10 Quah (1999c) documents these recent changes, draws parallels
to the failure of a putative Industrial Revolution in 14th-Century
China, and models how varied consumer attitudes towards sophisti-
cated technological goods—the demand side—can lead to high or low
growth in technologically-driven economies.
–18–
Cross-country growth
References
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt (1992) “A model of growth
through creative destruction,” Econometrica 60(2), 323–351, March
(1995) “Technical progress in the theory of economic growth,” In
Economics in a Changing World, ed. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, vol. 5 of
Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of the International Eco-
nomic Association, Moscow (London: St Martin’s Press) chapter 5,
pp. 101–122
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1962) “Economic welfare and the allocation of
resources for inventions,” In The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Princeton University Press and
NBER) pp. 609–625
Azariadis, Costas, and Allan Drazen (1990) “Threshold externali-
ties in economic development,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
105(2), 501–526, May
Barro, Robert J. (1997) Determinants of Economic Growth (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press)
Bernard, Andrew B., and Charles I. Jones (1996) “Productivity across
industries and countries: Time series theory and evidence,” Review
of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 135–146, February
Bloch, Francis (1996) “Sequential formation of coalitions in games
with externalities and ﬁxed payoﬀ division,” Games and Economic
Behavior 14(1), 90–123, May
Cameron, Gavin, James Proudman, and Stephen Redding (1998)
“Productivity convergence and international openness,” In Open-
ness and Growth, ed. James Proudman and Stephen Redding (Lon-
don: Bank of England) chapter 6, pp. 221–260
Coe, David T., and Elhanan Helpman (1995) “International R&D
spillovers,” European Economic Review 39(5), 859–887, May
–19–
Cross-country growth
David, Paul A. (1993) “Intellectual property institutions and the
panda’s thumb: Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets in economic
theory and history,” In Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property
Rights in Science and Technology, ed. M. B. Wallerstein, M. E.
Mogee, and R. A. Schoen (National Academy Press) chapter 2,
pp. 19–61
De Castro, Steve (1999) “Endogenous consumer-culture resistance
to creative destruction can explain convergence clubs,” Working
Paper, Universidade de Brasilia, September
Durlauf, Steven N. (1996) “On the convergence and divergence of
growth rates: An introduction,” Economic Journal 106(436), 1016–
1017, July
Durlauf, Steven N., and Danny Quah (1999) “The new empirics of
economic growth,” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. John B.
Taylor and Michael Woodford, vol. 1A (North Holland Elsevier
Science) chapter 4, pp. 231–304
Durlauf, Steven N., and Paul A. Johnson (1995) “Multiple regimes
and cross-country growth behavior,” Journal of Applied Economet-
rics 10(4), 365–384, October
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman (1991) Innovation and
Growth in the Global Economy (MIT Press)
Heston, Alan, and Robert Summers (1999) “The world distribution of
income: A synthesis of intercountry and intracountry data to mea-
sure worldwide material well-being,” Working Paper, Economics
Department, University of Pennsylvania, August
Howitt, Peter, and Philippe Aghion (1996) “Capital accumulation
and innovation as complementary factors in long-run growth,”
Journal of Economic Growth 3(2), 111–130, June
Industry Canada (1994) Building a More Innovative Economy (Ot-
tawa: Industry Canada)
–20–
Cross-country growth
Kaldor, Nicholas (1961) “Capital accumulation and economic
growth,” In The Theory of Capital: Proceedings of a Conference
Held by the International Economic Association, ed. Friedrich A.
Lutz and Douglas C. Hague (London: Macmillan) chapter 10,
pp. 177–222
Keely, Louise C. (1999) “Exchanging good ideas,” Working Paper,
LSE, November
Lucas, Robert E. (1988) “On the mechanics of economic develop-
ment,” Journal of Monetary Economics 22(1), 3–42, July
(1990) “Why doesn’t capital ﬂow from rich to poor countries?,”
American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 80(2), 92–
96, May
Milanovic, Branko (1999) “True world income distribution, 1988 and
1993: First calculation based on household surveys alone,” Working
Paper, The World Bank, Washington DC, May
Quah, Danny (1996) “Empirics for economic growth and conver-
gence,” European Economic Review 40(6), 1353–1375, June
(1997) “Empirics for growth and distribution: Polarization, strat-
iﬁcation, and convergence clubs,” Journal of Economic Growth
2(1), 27–59, March
(1999a) “6×109: Some dynamics of global inequality and growth,”
Working Paper, Economics Department, LSE, London, September
(1999b) “Ideas determining convergence clubs,” Working Paper,
Economics Department, LSE, London, July
(1999c) “The weightless economy in economic development,” Work-
ing Paper 155, United Nations University World Institute for De-
velopment Economics Research, Helsinki, January
Ray, Debraj (1998) Development Economics (Princeton University
Press)
–21–
Cross-country growth
Ray, Debraj, and Rajiv Vohra (1997) “Equilibrium binding agree-
ments,” Journal of Economic Theory 73(1), 30–78, February
(1999) “A theory of endogenous coalition structures,” Games and
Economic Behavior 26(2), 286–336, January
Romer, Paul M. (1990) “Endogenous technological change,” Journal
of Political Economy 98(5, part 2), S71–S102, October
(1994) “The origins of endogenous growth,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 8(1), 3–22, Winter
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1996) “The classical approach to convergence
analysis,” Economic Journal 106(437), 1019–1036, July
Solow, Robert M. (1956) “A contribution to the theory of economic
growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70(1), 65–94, February
(1957) “Technical change and the aggregate production function,”
Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3), 312–320, August
(1997) Learning from ‘Learning by Doing’: Lessons for Economic
Growth (Stanford University Press). The Kenneth J. Arrow Lec-
tures
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Hirofumi Uzawa, eds (1969) Readings in the
Modern Theory of Economic Growth MIT Press Cambridge MA
Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston (1988) “A new set of interna-
tional comparisons of real product and price levels estimates for
130 countries, 1950-1985,” Review of Income and Wealth 34(1), 1–
25, March
(1991) “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An expanded set of inter-
national comparisons, 1950–1988,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
106(2), 327–368, May
UK Department of Trade and Industry (1998) Our Competitive Fu-
ture: Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy (London: DTI)
–22–
Cross-country growth
World Bank (1998) World Development Report: Knowledge in Devel-
opment (Oxford University Press)
Yi, Sang-Seung (1997) “Stable coalition structures with externali-
ties,” Games and Economic Behavior 20(2), 201–237, August
–23–
Cross-country growth
time
Income distributions
t t+ s
Fig. 1: Emerging twin peaks in the cross-country income distribution
Post-1960 experiences projected over 40 years for named countries are
drawn to scale, relative to historical cross-country distributions.
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(a): Actual 1961 (b): Actual 1988
Fig. 2: Distributions across 98 countries (Densities of relative output
per worker)
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Stochastic kernel Levels: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
Fig. 3: Distribution dynamics across countries (Relative out-
put per worker) The right panel contains contour plots of the
15-year stochastic kernel in the left panel.
–26–
Cross-country growth
k/A
(δ + ν + ξ)τ−1
0
f(k/A)[k/A]−1
[k/A]∗
Fig. 4: k/A dynamics Convergence to steady state [k/A]∗ occurs
for all initial values [k/A].
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log y(t)
t0
ξt+ Γ0,a
ξt+ Γ0,b
log y1(0)
log y2(0)
log y3(0)
log y4(0)
Fig. 5: Time paths across countries Each economy shows tran-
sition from its initial level to a speciﬁc steady-state path. But a cross
section of economies, having diﬀerent underlying steady-state paths
varying with Γ0, shows a range of possible behaviors.
–28–
Cross-country growth
Y
t
Y
t
Leader
Follower




C1
C2
Fig. 6: Duality Modelling issue that underlies the left panel:
What is the rate—fast or slow—of Follower convergence to Leader?
Right panel: Which are the economies that converge, one to the
other? What glue binds and separates diﬀerent clusters like C1 and
C2?
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